August 12, 2000 Kursk, a state-of-the-art nuclear submarine, sank in the Barents Sea with the loss of all 118 crew-members. The accident was a dire reminder of the state of Russian naval nuclear affairs. The Northern Fleet is in heavy sea, with severe local pollution hazards and global proliferation risks in the wash of their nuclear prolusion activities.

The costal regions of the Northwest Russia, including the Kola Peninsula, have the greatest density of nuclear reactors on earth. Due to the extensive activities of the Russian Northern Fleet, almost one fifth of the world's reactors are located in this area. In addition to military submarine operations, several nuclear-powered naval surface vessels are in operation.

This article gives a snapshot of the proliferation and pollution potential associated with these naval reactor activities, including some background to and causes of today’s problems. Russian nuclear policies and foreign nuclear safety and security assistance will be discussed. While important progress has been made, much of the foreign support came with some hard-learned experiences. All lessons learned, good and bad, should be used to improve new rounds of cooperative efforts to limit the persistent nuclear security and safety risks in the region.

Since 1958, the Soviet Union and Russia have constructed 249 nuclear-powered submarines, representing more than half of the submarines produced worldwide[3]. Two thirds of these vessels were delivered to the Northern Fleet, the rest were destined for the Pacific Fleet. In addition to the combat submarines, five research and development submarines and several full-size land-based submarine-training facilities have been produced.

The majority of the constructed submarines have now reached the end of their service lives and have been decommissioned. The vessels await dismantlement, a process with huge safety (pollution) and security (proliferation) challenges[10].

The use, maintenance and decommissioning of all nuclear reactors generate radioactive waste that must be processed, transported and stored. Existing storage capacities for spent fuel is stretched to the limits, with nuclear assets sometimes kept in the open[11]. The situation threatens accidents and leakages to the environment, with subsequent exposures to populations and contamination of the environment.

Generally, in the open sea dumping regions, no contribution from the dumped radioactive waste can be found in the waters, sediments and biota[21]. However, enhanced levels of artificially produced radionuclides in sediments collected in the very close vicinity of almost all localized dumped objects demonstrate that leakages occur. The dumped material represents long-term pollution hazards.

As tragically evidenced by the Kursk, nuclear submarines are accident-prone. Most accidents have occurred while submarines have been on patrol, although some happened during refueling or repair operations (see below). Kursk is the fourth nuclear powered submarine from the Northern fleet to sink. All of the wrecked vessels had twin nuclear reactors, and two of them were carrying nuclear missiles. Long-term radioactive releases are likely. At the end of 2000, the Russians expressed interest in a joint Russian-Norwegian environmental impact assessment and surveillance programs to track radioactive releases from Kursk[22]. However, Russian officials recently claimed that the wreck will be hauled late summer 2001[23].

The risk of criticality accidents during the handling of the highly enriched fuel may be pronounced. Some of the spent fuel is stored in uncontrolled geometry (e.g. at Andreeva Bay), and a moderator like water is provided accidentally[24]. Other possible causes of criticality accidents are collisions, fire or explosions. In 1985, during refueling, a criticality accident occurred with a new core, contaminating the area surrounding a Pacific Soviet naval base in Chazhma Bay[25]. The releases are likely to primary to have local impact, but a similar criticality accident with a depleted core on the Kola shore could release quantities of radioactivity into the air and the Barents Sea, with effects on neighboring states[26].

Prospects of badly needed revenues have made Russia consider import of high-level radioactive waste. The powerful Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) claims that the plan could reap $ 21 billion over the next decade, vault Russia into the global nuclear service-industry and to provide cash to clean up radioactive hot-spots[27].

Others have raised concern that the import revenues will be used to boost the Minatom nuclear weapon complex, with the production of new and modernized warheads[28]. The import, likely to have a devastating effect on already critical and strained Russian storage capacities, awaits further considerations as the Russian Duma postponed voting on the nuclear fuel import bills March 22, 2001[29].

Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are the essential ingredients of any nuclear device. Russia alone may hold as much as 80 to 85 metric tons of HEU for naval propulsion[30]. The radiation levels of the fresh fuel are low and the enrichment levels make it potentially attractive in nuclear weapons. Fresh fuel diversion and possible exports of naval HEU and reactor technologies thus both represent proliferation risks.

However, spent fuel is not covered by the upgrades. Long cooling periods and thus reduced radiation levels may make this material attractive for separation to would-be proliferators due to the residual plutonium and HEU in the fuel[35]. Moreover, the U.S. has just stared assisting the Russians upgrading the 42 naval sites where nuclear weapons are stored. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, these sites contain 260 tons of nuclear material[36].

Military nuclear naval cooperation also takes place. In 1988, India leased a Russian Charlie-class nuclear submarine for three years. Late 2000, India again wanted a Russian SSN, and in March 2001, press reports indicate that Russia is ready to sell the Indian navy e.g. a Russian-built nuclear submarine[40]. Such sales, and future civilian exports inevitably will involve transfers of HEU. Russia has supplied fuel outside comprehensive safeguards in the past[41].

Russia has come a long way since the beginning of the 1990s. The country has adhered to the London Dumping Convention and abandoned its nuclear dumping[42], and has open up for several bi- and multilateral nuclear safety and security initiatives. Domestically, the control over decommissioned submarines, spent fuel, and radioactive waste has been transferred from the navy to Minatom[43].

Though not yet publicly available, Minatom has developed a conceptual plan for the management of radioactive wastes and spent fuel up to 2020[44]. The new policy involves interim storage of the spent fuel and is a significant, if temporary departure from a long-term closed cycle approach (reprocessing) to the management of spent fuel[45].

Funds for submarine dismantlement now create "oases" of revenue within the Russian naval complex[46]. The U.S. aid focuses on strategic threat reduction with assistance for missile elimination, warhead security, strategic ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) dismantlement, and the mentioned security upgrades at facilities with proliferation attractive fresh nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons[47].

Neighboring countries, like Norway, give local assistance to stop contamination, and to spent fuel and radioactive waste management. In response to concerns over Russian radioactive waste contamination of Norwegian fisheries in the Barents and Kara Seas and general worries over nuclear safety on the Kola Peninsula, Norway initiated its Plan of Action for nuclear issues in 1994[48]. In addition, several European Union Countries are involved in joint security and safety projects under the Tasic-umbrella[49].

However, while Russia, on one hand, is taking the problems seriously, and accepts international assistance where available, most of the problems persist. Mutual mistrust, cold war thinking and a relentless bureaucracy have hampered parts of this important cooperation. The most prominent cooperation deficiencies on both sides are summarized below.

While the project support has been fragmented, with a lack of coordination and an overall plan for the assistance on the donor side[50], the receiver end has not been ready to meet the requirements and expectations following the international nuclear cooperation. To optimize resources allocated (avoid redundancy and duplication of efforts), assure that priority needs are made known to the international community, and to provide points of contact to facilitate cooperation, efforts of coordination on behalf of the donor countries need to be strengthened. An important development is the Contact Expert Group for International Radwaste Projects in the Russian Federation.

The current fragmented international "band-aid" approach is in part due to the lack of prioritizing of program areas Russia wants to emphasize, making concerted efforts harder. The overall Minatom-plan under development for waste management is definitively a step in the right direction, once it is made public. The cooperation has been characterized by lack of facilitation on the Russian side. This is evidenced by access denial, stringent Russian licensing and certification requirements, liability problems and taxation on the aid provided.

The lack of supervision is a serious problem. Limited access hinders assessments studies and progress reporting, and endangers future international funding. The current storage conditions violate both international and Russian nuclear regulations, but no navy facilities are subjected to independent domestic supervision. In July 1995, President Yeltsin signed an order depriving the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, known in Russia by the acronym GAN, of control functions at defense ministry facilities. The summer of 2000, Minatom pushed through a government decree eliminating the rights of GAN to license and supervise any military-related facilities[51].

After almost a decade of assistance the bulk part of the problems remains. Of the 184 decommissioned submarines, the U.S. has allocated funds for the dismantling of 36 SSBNs. However, there is a lack of funds for dismantling the remaining ones, including all general-purpose submarines, of which the majority still has fuel onboard[52]. Moreover, plans for building storage facilities for the naval fuel have stranded, without even intermediate solutions for the high level waste. Thus, again, there is a need for international donors to contribute and coordinate efforts.

Solving the problems associated with Russian naval activities is a sole Russian responsibility. However, the remediation of naval bases and the safe interim storages of spent fuel in Northwest-Russia is in the interest of the international community. The pollution is a cross-border problem and the possible proliferation of navel HEU fuel a global security risks.

With serious nuclear safety and security challenges remaining, the international interest in solving the problems stands at risk of declining due to the lack of progress and persistent cooperation difficulties. Thus, there is a definitive need for Russia to further open up, and to the widest extent possible, facilitate the assistance given. Increased access while respecting Russian security concerns can be accomplished, as evidenced by the unique progress made in the joint U.S.-Russian security upgrades on the sensitive naval fresh fuel.

To renew and expand the interest amongst a widest possible range of future sponsors, the need for a political "resell" of both challenges and opportunities for concerted nuclear safety and security efforts in Northwest-Russia should be anticipated.

Ole Reistad, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, and Nils Bohmer, the Bellona Foundation provided useful comments for the preparation of this paper.