A Compendium of Striking Manhattan Project Quotes

Introduction

For several years now I have been researching the physics and history of the Manhattan Project, the United States Army’s World War II effort to develop and deploy the first generation of nuclear weapons. In reviewing literally thousands of documents on the Project, I began to come across so many striking remarks concerning the work and its effects that I began keeping a record of the more notable ones. These quotes cover topics ranging from the physics underlying nuclear weapons to the current world nuclear situation. I find it helpful to use some of them in a class I teach on the history of the Manhattan Project; they help students appreciate that scientists, generals, and public figures are also human beings who reflect on the consequences of their work and actions. In this article I reproduce excerpts from some of the more memorable of these quotes, arranged under a series of topic headings which proceed in roughly chronological order from some of the early discoveries of nuclear physics to the present-day situation: Neutrons, Nuclear Energy, and Fission; On the Possibility of Atomic Bombs; The Manhattan Engineer District, General Groves, Robert Oppenheimer, Los Alamos, and Trinity; Politics, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki; and Afterward. References to original sources are given for all quotes. I would certainly appreciate hearing from readers regarding further entries.

A note on source notation: A few entries have citations of the form Mxxxx-y, image zzzz. This refers to National Archives and Records Administration microfilm file Mxxxx, reel y, image zzzz on the DVD of the file supplied to this author by the NARA.

Neutrons, Nuclear Energy, and Fission

“I am afraid neutrons will not be of any use to any one.” [James Chadwick quoted in the February 29, 1932, edition of the New York Times; Kuhn (1932)]

“ ... [T]he neutron is practically the theme song of this whole project.” [Smyth report, sect. 1.18, Smyth (1945)]

“ ... [A]nyone who looked for a source of power in the transformation of the atoms was talking moonshine.” [Ernest Rutherford on prospect of harnessing nuclear energy; London Times, September 12, 1933]

“ ... [I]t suddenly occurred to me that if we could find an element which is split by neutrons and which would emit two neutrons when it absorbed one neutron, such an element, if assembled in sufficiently large mass, could sustain a nuclear chain reaction, liberate energy on an industrial scale, and construct atomic bombs.” [Leo Szilard reminiscence of conceiving chain reaction ca. September 1933, quoted in Feld et al. (1972) p. 530]

“When heavy nuclei are bombarded by neutrons, it is conceivable that the nucleus breaks up into several large fragments, which would of course be isotopes of known elements but would not be neighbors of the irradiated element.” [Ida Noddack on possibility of uranium fission; I. Noddack, “Über das Element 93,” Zeitschrift fur Angewandte Chemie 47(37), 653-655 (1934). An English translation prepared by H. G. Graetzer is available]

“Suppose someone gave you a quantity of pure 235 isotope of uranium — what would happen?” [Otto Frisch to Rudolf Peierls, early 1940, as related in Peierls (1985) pp. 154-155]

“I remember the spring of 1941 to this day. I realized then that a nuclear bomb was not only possible — it was inevitable. ... And I had then to start taking sleeping pills. It was the only remedy, I’ve never stopped since then. It’s 28 years, and I don’t think I’ve missed a single night in all those 28 years.” [James Chadwick, oral history interview, April 20, 1969; Oral History Interviews]

“Disintegration of Uranium by Neutrons: a New Type of Nuclear Reaction.” [Title of paper announcing discovery of fission; L. Meitner and O. R. Frisch; Nature 143(3615) 239-240, February 11, 1939]

Left: James Chadwick (1891-1974), discoverer of the neutron. Right: Leo Szilard (1898-1964), who conceived of the idea of a chain reaction. [Wikimedia Commons]

On the Possibility of Atomic Bombs

“That night there was very little doubt in my mind that the world was headed for grief.” [Leo Szilard recollection of observing secondary neutrons from fission, March 1939; Weart & Szilard (1978) p. 55]

“Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard ... leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future.” [Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt, August 2, 1939; Einstein's Letters to President Roosevelt]

“At that point we stared at each other and realized that an atomic bomb might after all be possible.” [Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, early 1940; Frisch (1979) p. 126]

“As a weapon, the super-bomb would be practically irresistible. There is no material or structure that could be expected to resist the force of the explosion.” [Frisch-Peierls Memorandum, March 1940. Reprinted in Serber (1992) pp. 80-88]

“A fission bomb of superlatively destructive power will result from bringing quickly together a sufficient mass of element U235. This seems to be as sure as any untried prediction based upon theory and experiment can be.” [Arthur Compton, National Academy of Sciences Uranium Committee report, Nov. 6, 1941; M1392-1, image 0491]

“The stuff will apparently be more powerful than we thought, the amount necessary appears to be less, the possibilities of actual production appear more certain.” [Vannevar Bush to President Roosevelt, March 9, 1942; M1392-1, image 1007]

“ ... I think the whole thing should be pushed not only in regard to development, but also with due regard to time. Time is very much of the essence. ...” [President Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush, March 11, 1942; M1392-1, image 0785]

“This is going to do it. Now it will become self-sustaining. The trace will climb and continue to climb; it will not level off.” [Enrico Fermi to Arthur Compton on the occasion of initiating the first self-sustaining chain reaction, December 2, 1942; Wattenberg (1993) p. 50]

“Fermi was as cool as a cucumber — much more so than his associates who were excited or a bit scared.” [Crawford Greenewalt, witness to startup of CP-1 reactor; quoted in Kelly (2007) pp. 86-87]

Genia (1908-1986) and Rudolf (1907-1995) Peierls in New York, 1943. Photograph by Francis Simon, courtesy AIP Emilio Segre Visual Archives.

Left: Otto Frisch (1904-1979). [Lotte Meitner-Graf, London, courtesy AIP Emilio Segre Visual Archives]. Right: Vannevar Bush (1890-1974), Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. [AIP Emilio Segre Visual Archives]

 

The Manhattan Engineer District, General Groves, Robert Oppenheimer, Los Alamos, and Trinity

“It bore no relation to the industrial or social life of our country; it was a separate state, with its own airplanes and its own factories and its thousands of secrets. It had a peculiar sovereignty, one that could bring about the end, peacefully or violently, of all other sovereignties.” [Herbert Marks on the Manhattan Engineer District; quoted in Lang (1959) p. 80]

“The object of the project is to produce a practical military weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is released by a fast neutron chain reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission.” [Robert Serber in The Los Alamos Primer; Serber (1992) p. 3]

“I fear we are in the soup.” [Vannevar Bush to Harvey Bundy (an aide to Henry Stimson) upon learning of Groves’ appointment to the Manhattan District; quoted in Norris (2002) p. 178]

“ ... [N]o one with whom I talked showed any great enthusiasm about Oppenheimer as a possible director of the project.” [General Groves; Groves (1983) p. 61]

“He couldn’t run a hamburger stand.” [Attributed to an unnamed friend of Oppenheimer by Luis Alvarez; Alvarez (1987) p. 78]

“The story of Robert Oppenheimer is as timely as today’s news and as timeless as a Greek tragedy.” [Senator Jeff Bigaman (D-NM), in Kelly (2006) p. 11]

“I think it was a real stroke of genius on the part of General Groves, who is not generally considered to be a genius, to have appointed him ...” [I. I. Rabi on appointment of Oppenheimer, interview in The Day After Trinity, John Else in association with KTEH-TV(1980), in minute 28]

“In all my life I have never known a personality more complex than Robert Oppenheimer.” [Abraham Pais on Robert Oppenheimer; Pais & Crease (2006) p. 139]

“Rome wasn’t built in a day, but then, DuPont didn’t have that job.” [Walter Simon, DuPont plant operations manager at Hanford Engineer Works; Thayer (1996) p. 35]

“The choice was to junk the whole discovery of the chain reaction that produced plutonium, and all of the investment in time and effort of the Hanford plant, unless somebody could come up with a way of assembling the plutonium material into a weapon that would explode.” [John Manley on the plutonium spontaneous fission crisis that led to the development of the implosion bomb; Hoddeson et al. (1993) p. 242]

“ ... [A]t that time there was not a single experimental result that gave good reason to believe that a plutonium bomb could be made at all.” [David Hawkins on the status of the plutonium bomb project as of mid-1944; Hawkins (1947) p. 143]

“It just goes to show the incompressibility of water.” [Robert Oppenheimer to McAllister Hull upon occasion of General Groves being sprayed on the backside by a jet of water; Hull & Bianco (2005) pp. 56-57]

Left: Manhattan Engineer District Commander General Leslie R. Groves (1896-1970). [Wikimedia Commons]. Right: Robert Oppenheimer (1904-1967), Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, ca.1944. [Wikimedia Commons]

“ ... [A]n immense project that was underway — a project looking to the development of a new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power.” [Henry Stimson to President Truman, April 12, 1945; Norris (2002) p. 375]

“Now I’m scared.” [Kenneth Greisen to I. I. Rabi, seconds before the Trinity detonation. Moments earlier, Rabi had asked Greisen

“Aren’t you nervous” as they lay on the ground. Los Alamos Historical Society (2002), p. 51]

“We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people cried, most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds. I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.” [Robert Oppenheimer on the Trinity test; interview in The Decision to Drop the Bomb, Atomic Archive movie]

“Now we are all sons of bitches.” [Kenneth Bainbridge to Robert Oppenheimer after Trinity test; Bainbridge in Wilson (1975) p. 230.]

“Suddenly, there was an enormous flash of light, the brightest light I have ever seen or that I think anyone has ever seen. It blasted; it pounced; it bored its way right through you. It was a vision which was seen with more than the eye. It was seen to last forever. You would wish it would stop; although it lasted about two seconds. Finally it was over, diminishing, and we looked toward the place where the bomb had been; there was an enormous ball of fire which grew and grew and it rolled as it grew; it went up into the air, in yellow flashes and into scarlet and green. It looked menacing. It seemed to come toward one. A new thing had just been born; a new control; a new understanding of man, which man had acquired over nature.” [I. I. Rabi description of Trinity test; Serber (1992) p. xvii, quoted from Rabi (1970) p. 138]

“The shot was truly awe-inspiring. Most experiences in life can be comprehended by prior experiences but the atom bomb did not fit into any preconception possessed by anybody. The most startling feature was the intense light.” [Norris Bradbury on Trinity test; Los Alamos Historical Society (2002) p. 53]

“I am sure that at the end of the world — in the last milli-second of the earth’s existence — the last man will see what we saw.” [George Kistiakowsky quoted in Laurence (1946) p. 11]

“I am about the only guy who actually looked at the damn thing — the first Trinity test. Everybody else had dark glasses, and the people at six miles couldn’t see it because they were all told to lie on the floor. I’m probably the only guy who saw it with the human eye.” [Richard Feynman, who viewed the Trinity test through an ultraviolet-light-absorbing truck windshield; Badash et al. (1980) p. 131]

“The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso, and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard … generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken, although one was some 125 miles away. ... A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1,200 feet … In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth … The steel from the tower was evaporated … I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb … Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away … My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, sixty miles away [reported] a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky”. [Excerpts from General Groves’ report to Henry Stimson on Trinity test, July 18, 1945. The memo is reprinted in Groves (1983) pp. 433-440]

“Even though the purpose was grim and terrifying, it was one of the greatest physics experiments of all time.” [Emilio Segrè on the Trinity test; Segrè (1970) p. 145]

“The war is over.” [General Thomas Farrell to General Groves after the Trinity test. Groves claims that his response was “Yes, after we drop two bombs on Japan.” Groves (1983) p. 298]

“Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling — to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1,200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower 1/2 mile away and knocked men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more. [President Truman diary entry, July 25, 1945; Ferrell (1996) p. 31]

“July 1945 at Alamogordo is the hinge of the century. Nothing after would ever be the same.” [Joseph Kanon in Kelly (2007) p. 146]

“Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at an opportune time.” [President Truman diary entry, July 18, 1945; Ferrell (1996) p. 30]

The Trinity explosion, July 16, 1945. [The Los Alamos National Laboratory Archives]

Politics, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki

“Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.” [Henry Stimson memo to President Truman, April 25, 1945; Stimson's 4/25/45 Memorandum; Sherwin (1987) pp. 291-292]

“The Secretary expressed the view ... that this project should not be considered simply in terms of military weapons, but as a new relationship of man to the universe. ... While the advances in the field to date had been fostered by the needs of war, it was important to realize that the implications of the project went far beyond the needs of the present war. It must be controlled if possible to make it an assurance of future peace rather than a menace to civilization.” [Interim Committee minutes, May 31, 1945; Interim Committee page]

“After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the Secretary expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by worker’s houses.” [Interim Committee minutes, May 31, 1945. Underlining as in original. Interim Committee page]

“The things we are working on are so terrible that no amount of protesting or fiddling with politics will save our souls.” Edward Teller in a letter to Leo Szilard, July 2, 1945; Weart & Szilard (1978) p. 208.]

“I had set as the governing factor that the targets chosen should be places the bombing of which would most adversely affect the will of the Japanese people to continue the war.” [Groves (1983) p. 267]

“Thus, we cannot hope to avoid a nuclear armament race either by keeping secret from the competing nations the basic scientific facts of nuclear power or by cornering the raw materials required for such a race. ... From this point of view, a demonstration of the new weapon might best be made, before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island.” [Excerpts from Frank Report, June 1945. Available at Manhattan Project Franck Report; see also The Uncensored Franck Report 1945-1946. Reprinted in Smith (1965) pp. 560-575]

“This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. ... It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.” [President Truman diary entry, July 25, 1945; Ferrell (1996) p. 31]

“Colonel, are we splitting atoms today?” [Enola Gay tail gunner Robert Caron to Colonel Paul Tibbets, en route to Hiroshima; quoted in Rhodes (1986) p. 707]

“My God, what have we done?” [Enola Gay co-pilot Robert Lewis journal entry after dropping bomb. Weintraub (1995) p. 424; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_A._Lewis. In Laurence (1946) p. 221 this is quoted as simply “My God.”]

“Results clearcut, successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than New Mexico tests. Conditions normal in airplane following delivery. Target at Hiroshima attacked visually. One-tenth cloud at 052315Z. No fighters and no flak.” [Commander William Parsons cable to Groves after Hiroshima drop; Groves (1983) p. 322]

“Apparently it went with a tremendous bang.” [General Groves to Oppenheimer, telephone conversation, August 6, 1945. http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/04/04/weekly-document-the-hiroshima-phone-call-1945/]

“I walked past Hiroshima station … and saw people with their bowels and brains coming out. … I saw an old lady carrying a suckling infant in her arms. … I just cannot put into words the horror I felt …” [17-year old at Hiroshima, quoted in Lifton (1969) p. 50]

“Thank God for the Atom Bomb” [Title of essay by Paul Fussell; Fussell (1988)]

“Finally Oppenheimer was able to quiet the howling crowd and he began to speak, hardly in low key. It was too early to determine what the results of the bombing might have been, but he was sure that the Japanese didn’t like it. More cheering. He was proud, and he showed it, of what we had accomplished. Even more cheering. And his only regret was that we hadn’t developed the bomb in time to have used it against the Germans. This practically raised the roof.” [Los Alamos physicist Sam Cohen describing Oppenheimer address following Hiroshima mission; Cohen (1983) pp. 21-22]

“Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. ... It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.” [Excerpt from President Truman press release, August 6, 1945; Ferrell (1996 ) p. 48]

“Bombed Nagasaki 090158Z visually. No opposition. Results technically successful. Visible effects about equal to Hiroshima. Proceeding to Okinawa. Fuel problem.” [Bockscar Radio Operator Abe Spitzer strike report on Nagasaki mission; Sweeney, Antonucci & Antonucci (1997) p. 220]

“The next bomb of the implosion type had been scheduled to be ready for delivery on the target on the first good weather after 24 August 1945. We have gained 4 days in manufacture and expect to ship from New Mexico on 12 or 13 August the final components. Providing there are no unforeseen difficulties in manufacture, in transportation to the theatre or after arrival in the theatre, the bomb should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August.” [Groves memo to General George C. Marshall, August 10, 1945; M1109-3, image 0653]

“The President, who usually comes to cabinet not later than 2:05, came in about 2:25 saying he was sorry to be late … Truman said he had given orders to stop atomic bombing. He said the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn’t like the idea of killing, as he said, ‘all those kids.’ ” [Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace diary entry, August 10, 1945; Blum (1973) pp. 473-4]

“Hiroshima saved lives, lots of them, lots of Japanese and many Americans. If there were a nuclear war today, it would be a destruction of both countries, so in that sense it cannot be repeated. But I think the realization that it cannot and must not be repeated was very much facilitated by Hiroshima. If we hadn’t had these two atomic bombings, people would not have realized what a terrible thing this is.” [Hans Bethe in Palevsky (2000), p. 70]

“At Los Alamos during World War II there was no moral issue with respect to working on the atom bomb. … The whole fate of the civilized world depended upon our succeeding before the Germans! … It is an open question as to whether the world is better or worse for our having made the atom bomb. … After Otto Hahn’s and Fritz Strassmann’s discovery it became evident that sooner or later some country would make an atom bomb. If an atom bomb had not been made and detonated in World War II, the world would be unprepared to cope with the tremendous threat of nuclear warfare. … warfare is no longer a rational means of settling differences between nations.” [Joseph Hirschfelder in Badash et al. (1980) pp. 68-70]

“The peoples of this world must unite or they will perish. This war, that has ravaged so much of the earth, has written these words. This atomic bomb has spelled them out for all men to understand. Other men have spoken them, in other times, of other wars, of other weapons. They have not prevailed. There are some, misled by a false sense of human history, who hold that they will not prevail today. It is not for us to believe that. By our works we are committed to a world united, before this common peril, in law, and in humanity.” [Robert Oppenheimer remarks on receiving Certificate of Appreciation from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, October 16, 1945; Pais & Crease (2006) p. 48]

“But when you come right down to it the reason we did this job is because it was an organic necessity. If you are a scientist you cannot stop such a thing. If you are a scientist you believe that it is good to find out how the world works; that it is good to find out what the realities are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the greatest possible power to control the world and to deal with it according to its lights and values.” [Robert Oppenheimer to Association of Los Alamos Scientists, November 2, 1945; Pais & Crease (2006) p. 51]

“In an enterprise such as the building of the atomic bomb the difference between ideas, hopes, suggestions and theoretical calculations, and solid numbers based on measurement, is paramount. All the committees, the politicking and the plans would have come to naught if a few unpredictable nuclear cross-sections had been different from what they are by a factor of two.” [Emilio Segrè quoted in Rhodes (1986) p. 8]

Afterward

“Give it back to the Indians.” [Robert Oppenheimer’s suggestion for the postwar fate of Los Alamos; Teller (2001), p. 219]

“That was the day I gave up hope, but that was not the day for me to say so publicly.” [Robert Oppenheimer on appointment of Bernard Baruch as United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; Pais & Crease (2006) p. 151]

“So for him to have alerted the world that we were going to make a hydrogen bomb at a time when we didn’t even know how to make one was one of the worst things he could have done.” [I. I. Rabi reaction to President Truman’s order to Atomic Energy Commission to continue work on “super” bomb; interview by Jeremy Bernstein, The New Yorker, October 2, 1975, p. 78]

“Necessarily such a weapon goes far beyond any military objective and enters the range of very great natural catastrophes. By its very nature it cannot be confined to a military objective but becomes a weapon which in practical effect is almost one of genocide.” [Enrico Fermi and I. I. Rabi minority statement to Atomic Energy Commission General Advisory Committee report on prospect of development of “super” bomb, October 1949; GAC (1949)]

“ ... I feel I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which I understand better and therefore trust more.” [Edward Teller testimony regarding Robert Oppenheimer at Oppenheimer’s 1954 security hearing; Goodchild (2004) p. 244]

“ ... [T]here is no indication in the entire record that Dr. Oppenheimer has ever divulged any secret information.” [Henry Smyth in his dissenting report on Oppenheimer security hearing; quoted in Goodchild (1980) p. 265; see also Atomic Archive Oppenheimer report]

“But I also think that it was a damn good thing that the bomb was developed, that it was recognized as something important and new, and that it would have an effect on the course of history. In that world, in that war, it was the only thing to do. I only regret that it was not done two years earlier. I would have saved a million or more lives.” [Robert Oppenheimer, New York Times Magazine, August 1, 1965, p. 8]

“I think it is just possible, Mr. President, that it has taken some charity and some courage for you to make this award today.” [Oppenheimer to President Lyndon Johnson upon being given the Fermi Award, December 2, 1963; Bird & Sherwin (2005) p. 574]

“The world has changed, but the current arsenal carries the baggage of the cold war. There is the baggage of significant numbers in reserve. There is the baggage of a nuclear stockpile beyond our needs. What is it we’re really trying to deter? Our current arsenal does not address the threats of the 21st century.” [General James E. Cartwright, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander of the United States Nuclear Forces, May 2012; NYTimes Cartwright article]

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The articles in this issue represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily those of the Forum or APS.