Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World

By David Hafemeister (Springer International Pub. AG., Switzerland, 2016), 434 + xxiv pages, $45, ISBN 978-3-319-25365-7.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most serious problems facing the world today. As the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons increases so does the probability of a nuclear exchange caused either deliberately or by accident. Also an increase in the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons grade materials in the world increases the possibility that terrorist groups will obtain and use nuclear weapons. Hafemeister’s book is an extensive discussion of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. It covers all aspects of the subject from Rutherford’s discovery of the nucleus to the current situation. It is intended as a textbook for an upper division undergraduate course. Hafemeister is particularly well qualified to discuss this subject, having taught such a course for over 40 years and having served on numerous governmental and other committees dealing with arms control matters.

Hafemeister considers three main issues: the major-power arms race, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and terrorism especially after 9/11. He begins with a history of the atomic age. Nuclear research following Rutherford’s discovery of the nucleus led to the discovery of nuclear fission. The fear that Germany would develop fission bombs led to the Manhattan project and the development of the first atomic bombs by the United States. Fission bombs were soon followed by hydrogen fusion bombs. Within a fairly short time other countries, notably the UK, USSR, China, and France, also developed nuclear weapons. Delivery of nuclear weapons by airplane was followed by land based and sea launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Attempts at ballistic missile defense have been unsuccessful and seem mostly to have been destabilizing. Finally the arms race between the US and the USSR has been partly ended by various arms control treaties along with methods of verification. At present, programs of arms control have been slowed by the cooling of relations between the US and Russia and by attempts of China to catch up with the US and Russia. Given the present political and diplomatic situation, Hafemeister finds it difficult to see how Russia, China, and the US can collaborate to reduce nuclear deployment.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons usually refers to the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems by countries other than the US, UK, Russia, China, and France. Other countries having nuclear weapons are India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Countries that have had nuclear weapons but have given them up include South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. A number of countries have started weapons development programs but terminated them: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Iraq, Japan, Libya, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and Taiwan. Iran currently does not have nuclear weapons but appears to have had a development program. This program was put on hold by the recent deal with Iran. Several treaties attempt to control proliferation including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban treaty. To reduce proliferation, the US purchased large quantities of weapons grade uranium and plutonium from states of the Former Soviet Union. Control of proliferation is made difficult because of the use of nuclear reactors for power. It is possible to produce nuclear weapons from reactor grade plutonium. To reduce this possibility, the US limits the reprocessing of spent fuel originating in the US. And the International Atomic Energy Agency maintains safeguards over both reactor and weapons grade plutonium.

One of the major concerns related to nuclear weapons is that terrorists might get their hands on them. Terrorists might use stolen nuclear weapons or improvised devices made with stolen nuclear materials. Terrorists would not need to have a fully functional nuclear bomb. For their purposes it would be enough to have a “dirty bomb” that would spread radioactivity even without a full nuclear explosion. So far there has been no evidence of terrorists trying to get nuclear weapons. This may be because of safeguards, because of the difficulty of making nuclear devices, or because terrorists can produce the same amount of destruction more easily with chemical or biological weapons.

Hafemeister’s book is an excellent introductionto the history and the current state of nuclear weapons. However, it is not an easy book to read. There is so much material covering so many topics that it requires a very careful reading to get the maximum understanding of the subject. Unfortunately there are two serious flaws in the book. First, there is no index. This is bad enough for any non-fiction book but especially for a textbook. This book particularly needs references to all of the many acronyms. I often found it difficult to remember what the acronyms stand for and could not look back to the original definitions. There is a glossary, but it does not list all of the acronyms and I did not find it particularly useful. The second flaw is the large number of errors in the text. These are mostly minor typographical errors but some are more serious. There are a number of places where figures, tables, or definitions are not clear and are likely to cause serious confusion to the students.

Kenneth S. Mendelson
Professor emeritus of physics
Marquette University
Email: kenneth.mendelson@marrquette.edu

These contributions have not been peer-refereed. They represent solely the view(s) of the author(s) and not necessarily the view of APS.